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The Spanish Civil War played a unique role in the Soviet Union’s geo-political strategies in the 
second half of the 1930s. The conflict marked the first occasion that Moscow participated in 
a foreign war beyond its traditional spheres of influence. But Soviet involvement in the Span-
ish war went far beyond the sale of armor and aviation to the beleaguered Spanish Republic. 
While Moscow organized and supported the creation of the International Brigades, on the 
cultural front, the Soviets sought to roll out a broad program of propaganda, employing film, 
poster art and music to link the destinies of the Slavic and Hispanic peoples. If scholars have 
succeeded in recent years to rewrite the history of many components of Soviet participation 
in the Spanish Civil War, diplomatic relations between the Republic and Moscow remain an 
unexplored theme. This is the conclusion of a two-part article that explores declassified, un-
published official documents, as well as memoirs, newsreels, private letters and the press, to 
offer the first narrative history of the Republican embassy in Moscow. In part one, the diplo-
matic rapprochement between the USSR and Spain in 1933 was explored as a prelude to the 
exchange of ambassadors following the outbreak of the civil war in summer 1936. The posting 
of the young Spanish doctor Marcelino Pascua to a newly recreated Moscow embassy was then 
examined in detail, up to the end of summer 1937. In the second part, the successes, failures 
and denouement of Pascua’s mission are set against the backdrop of the Republic’s dwindling 
fortunes in the civil war. 
Keywords: Spain, USSR, Spanish Civil War, Joseph Stalin, diplomacy, Europe 1918–1939, 
Moscow.
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Гражданская война в Испании сыграла уникальную роль в геополитических стратегиях 
Советского Союза во второй половине 1930-х гг. Конфликт ознаменовал первый слу-
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чай, когда Москва участвовала в зарубежной войне за пределами своих традиционных 
сфер влияния. Советская вовлеченность в испанскую войну вышла далеко за пределы 
продажи брони и авиации осажденной Испанской Республике. В то время как Москва 
организовывала и поддерживала создание интернациональных бригад, на культурном 
фронте Советы стремились развернуть широкую программу пропаганды, используя 
кино, плакатное искусство и музыку для увязки судеб славянского и испаноязычного 
народов. Если в последние годы ученым удалось переписать историю многих составля-
ющих советского участия в гражданской войне в Испании, то дипломатические отно-
шения между республикой и Москвой остаются неизученной темой. В заключительной 
части публикации анализируются рассекреченные, неопубликованные официальные 
документы, а также мемуары, кинохроника, частные письма и пресса, чтобы предло-
жить первую повествовательную историю республиканского посольства в  Москве. 
В  первой части дипломатическое сближение между СССР и  Испанией в  1933  г. рас-
сматривалось как прелюдия к обмену послами после начала гражданской войны в Ис-
пании летом 1936  г. Рассказывалось об отправке молодого испанского врача Марсе-
лино Паскуа в недавно воссозданное московское посольство. Во второй части успехи, 
неудачи и развязка миссии Паскуа разворачиваются на фоне уменьшающихся шансов 
республики на победу в ходе гражданской войны.
Ключевые слова: Испания, СССР, гражданская война в  Испании, Иосиф Сталин, 
дипломатия, Европа 1918–1939 гг., Москва.
In the first instalment of this two-part series, the diplomatic rapprochement between 
the USSR and Spain in 1933 was explored as a prelude to the exchange of ambassadors 
following the outbreak of the civil war in summer 1936. The appointment of the young 
Spanish doctor Marcelino Pascua to the new Moscow embassy was then examined in 
detail. The second part explores the period a year later and then elucidates multiple diffi-
culties confronting Ambassador Pascua from the start. The most intractable problem for 
Pascua’s mission to Moscow was general neglect by the Republic’s Foreign Ministry. From 
the moment Republican Spain resumed normal diplomatic ties with the Soviet Union 
in August 1936 — a time, it should be added, when the Republic had everything to gain 
from large-scale and well-orchestrated lobbying of Stalin’s regime — its commitment to 
the Moscow mission was curiously weak. The digression on embassy lodgings in the first 
part of this series well illustrated the expectation in autumn 1936 — held by both Pascua 
and Soviet officials — that the Republic’s embassy would soon be busy and well-staffed. 
Yet Pascua would occupy his post for a little more than one year, and his tenure would be 
marked by extended absences1. With the ambassador away from post, the Spanish mission 
was overseen by the second in command, Vicente Polo. In July 1938, Manuel Martínez 
Pedroso was appointed commercial attaché to Moscow2. This was the extent of personnel 
in the embassy during the war. Neither Polo nor Pedroso, it should be noted, were ever 
elevated to the status of ambassador.
Pascua understood more than anyone else the disadvantages of Spain's support of its 
embassy in the Soviet Union. Indeed, even before the ambassador left on his assignment, 
he was given a sober preview of the obstacles he would face at the hands of the Foreign 
1 On Pascua’s December 1937 trip to Spain, see: Zugazagoitia J. Guerra y vicissitudes de los Españoles: 
in 2 vols. Vol. II. Paris, 1941. P. 75.
2 Del Vayo to Pedroso, 3 July 1938 // Archivo Histórico Nacional (AHN-Madrid). Diversos. M. Pascua. 
Leg. 2. Exp. 12, 2.
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Ministry. In late September 1936, for example, he attempted to convince his superiors of 
the need to appoint an aviation attaché to the Moscow office. At the time, the Nationalists 
enjoyed unchallenged control of the skies, and Pascua believed that a leading Spanish avi-
ator — a certain Mellado — could do much in the Soviet Union to ensure that the Repub-
lican air force received the necessary training and equipment. Prieto refused to authorize 
the request for Mellado to visit the USSR. The day prior to Pascua’s departure, Mellado 
was lost over enemy territory3. Later, Pascua’s entreaties to the Foreign Ministry to create 
a consulate in Leningrad were also ignored4.
This crisis of personnel naturally put the new ambassador, who was eager to make 
a good impression and rapidly assess Soviet attitudes towards the Republican cause, at 
a considerable disadvantage. In his first telegram to the ministry, sent on the day of his 
arrival in the Russian capital, Pascua implored his government to relieve him of the early 
handicap:
Arrived today in Moscow received cordially as in Leningrad. Request the immediate 
incorporation of embassy staff which for the moment you may limit to a secretary and a 
commercial attaché5.
Two days hence, still having heard nothing from Madrid regarding further appoint-
ments, Pascua sent a more urgent and detailed request for the completion of his staff:
In view of immediate necessities, I should like to suggest to you… the following composition 
for this delegation: a secretary general of the embassy, a commercial and economic attaché and 
a military attaché. The first of these might also serve as consul general for this city… At the 
same time, it is advisable to establish a consul on the Black Sea, preferably in Batum or Odessa, 
as accords with the future development of our commerce with the USSR. I beseech your grace 
to immediately send this delegation. The conditions in which I am currently forced to work — 
without a single compatriot and with the Spanish-less interpreter whom the Commissariat has 
lent me — are extremely harmful6. 
Indeed, so overwhelmed and short-handed was Pascua in his first days in Moscow 
that the commissariat lent him, in addition to the interpreter, a small staff of secretaries 
and assistants7. In this way the new ambassador was able to carry out the necessary for-
malities involved in establishing an embassy, such as distributing and receiving commu-
nications from the diplomatic community and arranging interviews with Soviet officials.
Neither Pascua’s frequent entreaties to the Foreign Ministry nor the unconventional 
and risky practice of borrowing NKID functionaries to carry out official Spanish business 
succeeded in rousing Republican officials to assign adequate personnel to the Moscow 
embassy. Three months after arriving in Russia, Pascua was provided with only one staff 
member — in the ambassador’s words, “a second-class secretary with no experience what-
soever, young and amateurish, who cannot even take shorthand or type”8. This was at a 
3 Zugazagoitia J. Guerra y vicissitudes de los Españoles. P. 170. 
4 Viñas A. Al Servicio de la Republica. Madrid, 2010. P. 80.
5 Pascua to Foreign Ministry, 7 Oct. 1936 // AHN-Madrid. Diversos. M. Pascua. Leg. 2. Exp. 9. — The 
“white book” was in all probability a protocol guide issued by the Foreign Ministry. 
6 Pascua to Foreign Ministry, 9 Oct. 1936 // AHN-Madrid. Diversos. M. Pascua. Leg. 1. Exp. 19, 4.
7 AHN-Madrid. Diversos. M. Pascua. Leg. 5. Exp. 7, 5.
8 Pascua to Negrín, 27 Oct. 1937 // Ibid. Leg. 2. Exp. 2, 22.
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time when many of the Republic’s most seasoned diplomats languished in Latin American 
capitals, doing practically nothing9. Writing to Asúa, he expressed incomprehension at the 
lack of support.
I am very concerned with the continuous lack of information from the Ministry to this 
embassy, despite my petitions. There is no excuse for this absence of both materials and staff … 
and it is translating into very difficult situations for me10. 
Yet throughout 1937, the conditions Pascua faced did not improve. On the occasion 
of the one-year mark of his tenure, the ambassador sent the new prime minister, Juan 
Negrín, a scathing rumination on twelve months of seclusion:
The embassy of the Republic in the USSR, whose transcendent importance at the present 
moment… I need not remind you, possesses a staff consisting of a second-class secretary… and 
the ambassador… I would not be carrying out my assigned duties were I not to reiterate to you 
that this situation, and above all its prolongation without resolution, is a complete and absolute 
disgrace…11
The letter closes with Pascua’s offer to resign if for some reason the government no 
longer has faith in him. The response from Valencia, arriving a month later, was a per-
functory reassurance and the promise to send two additional secretaries to Moscow12. 
They never appeared. 
In the event, however, a pair of added staff members could not have repaired the se-
rious damage to the Spanish Republic’s diplomatic prestige in the Russian capital. Pascua’s 
spirits, moreover, plummeted as his isolation grew more acute. Writing to Zugazagoitia in 
late November 1937, the ambassador was exasperated and livid:
Let me assure you that I am undergoing a period of tremendous difficulty and my patience 
is buoyed only by the fundamental consideration of what the USSR can do for us in certain areas 
at this time… Greatly contributing to my desolate state is the almost criminal fact that I have no 
staff in the embassy, that is, advisors, secretaries, attachés, etc., despite repeated and anguished 
requests13.
When Pascua departed permanently for his French reassignment in March 1938, 
the Spanish neglect of their Moscow embassy was only heightened. His successors, the 
commercial attaché Polo and later the chargé d’affaires Pedroso, each found themselves 
increasingly cut off from the Republic and alienated from the Soviet regime. Indeed, in 
the last year of the war the Spanish mission in Moscow was a wholly ineffective embassy, 
incapable of carrying out any serious responsibilities related to government business or 
9 Amorós M. 75 Años Despues: Las Claves de la Guerra Civil Española. Barcelona, 2014.
10 Pascua to Asúa, 6 Jan. 1937 // AHN-Madrid. Diversos. M. Pascua. Leg. 2. Exp. 13, 11.
11 Pascua to Negrín, 27 Oct. 1937 // Ibid. Exp. 2, 22.
12 Giral to Pascua, 26  Nov. 1937  //  Ibid. Exp. 14, 6.  — Earlier, in February 1937, the republic had 
appointed a consul general to Odessa (see: Negrín to Pascua, 7 Feb. 1938 // Ibid. Exp. 2, 37). However, the 
appointment had not been taken up even the following November, when Pascua put the matter before the 
Soviets. Stalin was amenable to this, voicing no objection, but it is curious how long the Republic delayed 
in finalizing the matter (see: Arkhiv prezidenta Rossiskoi Federatsii (APRF). F. 3. Op. 65. D. 218. L. 10–11).
13 Pascua to Zugazagoitia, 28 Nov. 1937 //AHN-Madrid. Diversos. M. Pascua. Leg. 2. Exp. 13, 21.
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the war effort. As critical problems continued to arise in Soviet–Republican relations, the 
mission’s failure became more conspicuous.
Although the personnel crisis neither improved nor worsened after spring 1938, Pas-
cua’s departure had the effect of accelerating the impoverishment of the Moscow mission. 
In part, this was a straightforward issue of financing. Once Pascua was reassigned to Paris, 
the Foreign Ministry never appointed a new ambassador to Moscow. The most immediate 
result of the ministry’s inaction was a precipitous drop in the funds available to sustain 
the Moscow mission. As an ambassador to Moscow, Pascua was paid a standard salary of 
12,856 French francs per month. In addition, he was also provided with an expense allow-
ance of 43,712 francs, out of which he was responsible for paying the various and sundry 
costs associated with his office: food, supplies, receptions, fuel, heating, transportation, 
pouch and courier expenses, etc.14 When Pascua left the embassy in spring 1938, the com-
mercial attaché Polo assumed all of his duties. Yet Polo’s salary remained what it had been 
when he was subordinate to Pascua: a regular income of 2600 francs plus a niggardly ex-
pense budget of 6241 francs. Put another way, for the last year of the Republic’s existence, 
the Foreign Ministry had reduced its budget for the Moscow embassy by almost 85 per-
cent, from a total of 56,568 francs a month under Pascua to Polo’s combined 8841 francs15. 
The lack of funds led to real and immediate problems in the embassy’s day-to-day 
operations. Quite apart from the frequent shortages of this or that necessity that one might 
expect during any long stay in Soviet Russia — such as the lack of writing paper in the 
embassy during the summer of 193816 — Pascua’s successors faced pecuniary straits that 
threatened to shut down the entire mission. On 14  April 1938, for example, Polo was 
instructed to hold a reception at the embassy to commemorate the seventh anniversary 
of the declaration of the Second Spanish Republic. Invitations went out to members of 
the Spanish colony resident in and around Moscow, including the teachers working with 
the evacuated children and the four families of the Bank of Spain17. Ten days after the 
event, a distraught Polo alerted Pascua that he had paid for the entire affair out of his own 
pocket, even though his salary remained unchanged and the ministry had not given him 
an operating budget. “I am now in a situation where I genuinely lack sufficient money,” 
Polo wrote, “because my Ministry has paid me only part of my salary and not even every 
month…”18
From July 1938 until the end of the war, the Moscow embassy’s financial problems 
steadily increased. The de facto head who now bore the brunt of this financial crisis was 
Manuel Pedroso, Polo’s successor and the Foreign Ministry’s third and final front man in 
its Moscow mission. As was the case during Polo’s tenure, Pedroso found himself finan-
cially cut off from his home government, and his entreaties for prompt payment of salary 
and expenses often elicited no response whatsoever. With the war drawing to a close, he 
faced new responsibilities that required both regular funding and close collaboration with 
14 See the Moscow embassy’s account statements provided by the Bank for Foreign Trade USSR 
(AHN-Madrid. Diversos. M. Pascua. Leg. 15. Exp. 1, 1–9).
15 Ibid.
16 Polo to Pascua, 7 June 1938 // Ibid. Leg. 2. Exp. 10-1, 15.
17 Soviet officials were not invited to the function. According to the chargé d’affaires Pedroso, since the 
ambassador was not in attendance, the occasion was not considered sufficiently formal to merit diplomatic 
invitations. — See: Pedroso to Foreign Ministry, 23 Apr. 1938 // Archivo de Ministro de Asuntos Exteriores 
(AMAE), Madrid, Archivo de Barcelona. Apt. 1. Carp. 57. Informe 2, 687–688.
18 Polo to Pascua, 24 Apr. 1938 // AHN-Madrid. Diversos. M. Pascua. Leg. 2. Exp. 10-3, 3.
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his advisors. The most important of these duties included his attempts to repatriate the 
three thousand Spanish children and their teachers who had been evacuated to the USSR 
earlier in the war19. In addition, he was also obliged to see to the proper disposal of the 
embassy contents, most notably the archive. 
Pascua intervened when he could from Paris, sending the Moscow mission small 
amounts of cash via diplomatic pouch20. These donations kept the embassy afloat through 
the winter of 1938–39, but as the end neared, the futility of Pedroso’s frustrated efforts 
became apparent. By early March 1939, the chargé d’affaires reported that, “apart from a 
handful of rubles and a few British pounds, I am out of money”21. The embassy, he con-
tinued, had received no money from the government in either January or February. What 
made the situation most egregious was that the ministry had ordered Pedroso to return 
to Barcelona the sum of 5,000 pounds, funds that had earlier been set aside to eventually 
evacuate the Moscow mission22. Pascua, when he learned that Pedroso had obeyed the or-
der, was furious: “It was an enormous error on your part to send back the 5,000… Imagine 
what that quantity of money would have allowed you to accomplish and the freedom of 
movement which it would have granted you”23. 
A notoriously poor communications system between the Moscow embassy and the 
Foreign Ministry (which, after November 1936, was located in Valencia with the rest of 
the government) exacerbated the problem of support and made matters considerably 
worse. As with other aspects of the Spanish mission, the deficiency here lay only partially 
in technological shortcomings, but chiefly in the Republic’s poorly placed priorities and 
unwillingness to collaborate with the Soviets. When Pascua arrived in Russia in October 
1936, the Soviets had already tested and established telephone and radio links between 
the Foreign Commissariat and its Madrid mission24. Naïvely, perhaps, Pascua believed 
that this same link would permit him to communicate with his own government25. In the 
event, neither Pascua nor any of his adjutants ever gained access to the direct line. Instead, 
to communicate with their superiors, staffers in the Moscow embassy were forced to rely 
on slow and insecure methods: through a courier, via rail and air to the Republic’s French 
embassy (to be relayed from Paris to the Foreign Ministry in Spain), or through the NKID’s 
own telegram service and diplomatic pouch. The first option was slow and vulnerable to 
breaches of security; the second choice was even less satisfactory, as it required full trust 
in the Soviets’ confidentiality. “Needless to say”, Pascua told his ministry upon receiving 
the Soviet offer to forward Spanish mail, “until I receive your express authorization I will 
abstain from employing [the NKID] method”26.
19 On the evacuated children, see: Zafra E. Los niños españoles evacuados a la URSS. Madrid, 1989; 
Kowalsky  D. La Unión Soviética y la guerra civil española: una revisión crítica. Barcelona, 2004. P. 96–
120. — This has now been complemented by a number of recent accounts: Castillo S. Mis años en la escuela 
soviética. Madrid, 2009; Limonero I. C. Dos patrias, tres mil destinos: vida y exilio de los niños de la Guerra 
de España refugiados en la Union Soviética. Madrid, 2010.
20 Pedroso to Pascua. 6 Dec. 1938 // AHN-Madrid. Diversos. M. Pascua. Leg. 2. Exp. 12, 12. 
21 Pedroso to Pascua. 3 Mar. 1939 // Ibid. Exp. 12, 25.
22 Ibid.
23 Pascua to Pedroso. 12 Mar. 1939 // Ibid. Exp. 12, 24.
24 The direct line between Moscow and Madrid was no secret. On 16 Oct. 1936 — a week after Pascua’s 
arrival — Izvestiia touted the achievement on its front page. 
25 Pascua to Foreign Ministry, 9 Oct. 1936 // AHN-Madrid. Diversos. M. Pascua. Leg. 1. Exp. 19, 4.
26 Ibid.
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The Spaniards’ careless use of codes in diplomatic correspondence compounded the 
communications crisis. The code system established to communicate with the embassies 
was by many accounts easily compromised, and Pascua was convinced of its vulnerabil-
ity. In an October 1937 letter to Negrín, he informed the prime minister that the Soviets 
almost certainly possessed the Republic’s codes27. On other occasions, Pascua confessed 
that a lack of confidence in the security of his dispatches prevented him from speaking 
his mind28. By early 1938, the ambassador’s fears for the vulnerability of his dispatches led 
him to develop, together with the chargé d’affaires Polo, a private code for their personal 
correspondence29.
It was both due to the Republic’s inattention to the ongoing communications cri-
sis and the Russians’ code-cracking prowess that on several occasions Soviet officials 
demanded that their Spanish allies rectify the problem. In a February conference with 
Pascua, Stalin gave the ambassador a stern and three-pronged message: 1)  the Loyalist 
codes are too easy to read; 2) codes must be changed daily; and 3) it is always preferable 
to send a personal courier over a coded telegram30. This advice was clearly not heeded, for 
eight months later, in October, Voroshilov felt compelled to again rebuke Pascua for using 
insecure communications methods. On this occasion, the defense commissar urged the 
ambassador to use a diplomatic pouch rather than telegrams or regular mails31.
One consequence of the embassy’s neglect and the poor communications between 
the Republic’s Foreign Ministry and Moscow was a tendency toward serious breakdowns 
in the relay of specific orders. When letters to the ministry could take up to a month to 
reach Spain, and the reply another several weeks, the result was a general paralysis of the 
Republic’s Moscow outpost32. At times, Loyalist messages to the embassy were delayed on 
arriving, only to be held up further by the embassy’s poor coordination with the Soviet 
leadership. In June 1938, for example, Polo learned from unreliable sources that a group of 
Spanish refugee children were to arrive in Leningrad within a week. As the highest official 
working in the embassy, he had a responsibility to tend to the children’s welfare. “Officially,” 
he wrote, “nothing on this matter has been communicated to me, neither through Soviet 
channels, nor, something even more unpardonable, through Spanish channels”33. Were it 
not for the rumor mill, Polo would have been unaware of the refugees’ impending arrival.
A more prominent example of the communication problem was brought to light 
during Pascua’s February 1938 conference with Stalin, Molotov, and Voroshilov. The de-
fense commissar loudly complained to the ambassador that the communication crisis be-
27 Pascua to Negrín, 29 Oct. 1937 // AHN-Madrid. Diversos. M. Pascua. Leg. 2, Exp. 2, 23.
28 Pascua to Negrín, 28 Nov. 1937 // Ibid. Exp. 2, 26. — The relevant passage is worth quoting in full: 
“For some time I’ve considered sending you a report on Soviet international politics and their repercussion 
on Spain’s domestic front. After much reflection I have opted not to for fear of its possible capture”.
29 Pascua to Polo, undated // Ibid. Exp. 2, 23.
30 Conference with Stalin, Molotov, and Voroshilov, 2 Feb. 1937 // Ibid. Exp. 6, 4.
31 Conference with Molotov and Voroshilov, 21 Oct. 1937 // Ibid. Exp. 7-1, 2. — At the same meeting, 
another facet of the republic’s code problem proved particularly embarrassing. Pascua had requested the 
interview in order to relay a recent and urgent request from his government for additional Soviet military 
shipments. Face to face with the ambassador, Voroshilov asked bluntly, “What material is needed most 
urgently?” Pascua replied that the coded telegram requesting the arms was indecipherable; Voroshilov 
would have to wait for his reply. 
32 See, for example: Giral to Pascua 26 Nov. 1937 // Ibid. Exp. 14, 6. — The letter is a reply to Pascua’s 
note of 26 October. Giral apologizes for the late response, adding that he received it “only a few days ago”.
33 Polo to Pascua, 23 June 1938 // Ibid. Exp. 10-4, 1.
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tween Valencia and Moscow had reached the point where he no longer knew the needs of 
the Popular Army. While the shamed Pascua looked on, Voroshilov bellowed furiously: 
You have constantly been demanding bombers. As a result of our last conversation, we are 
now ready to send sixty-one bombers. Only now we are being told that you want thirty bombers 
and thirty fighters?34
As if Voroshilov’s tone and message were not adequately clear, Pascua left a brief com-
ment written to himself regarding the commissar’s harangue in the notes of the meeting 
record: “He says this in order to call attention to [our] disorientation and critical lack of 
information”35.
The foregoing should make clear that, from the time of its founding in October 
1936 until the end of the war in the spring of 1939, the Republican mission to Moscow 
was severely handicapped by numerous factors, the most important of which was the Re-
publican government’s refusal or inability to lend proper support. To gain a better sense 
of the extent of the neglect, one need only look at the mission Pascua took over in Paris 
in the spring of 1938. As of 22 January 1939, the Spanish Republic’s embassy in France in-
cluded some thirty-six Spanish nationals on the payroll. Among them were five secretaries 
and seven separate attachés, including postings specific to the military, navy, agriculture, 
finance, commerce, as well as two “special” attachés. The embassy also had two full-time 
coders as well as a support staff including three chauffeurs, a diplomatic pouch courier, 
several doormen, and even a night porter36. By contrast, at no point did the Moscow em-
bassy have more than two Spanish employees on staff; for the last year of the war, it had 
no ambassador. 
Admittedly, this comparison is tempered by certain factors. Given the long history 
of close Spanish diplomatic ties with France (one of only two states with which Spain 
shares a border), the Foreign Ministry had always provided strong support to its Parisian 
delegation. Meanwhile, the Moscow embassy staff had to be created from scratch, and was 
thus handicapped from the beginning. The Republic’s government potentially had much 
to gain from its relations with the French, even if the Paris government had prohibited the 
sale of arms to the Loyalists, and for the first year of the war refused to open its borders 
for the transit of weaponry37. It should also be noted that the Republic’s embassy in France 
performed other indirect functions vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. For example, a portion of 
Soviet assistance to the Republic was purchased in third countries, and paid for through 
the Banque Commerciale pour l’Europe du Nord (or Eurobank), located in Paris38. An-
other, but perhaps more significant factor was concerned with the tendency of the Repub-
lican legation in France to present the Republic’s requests for military matériel directly to 
the Soviet embassy in Paris39.
34 Conference with Stalin, Molotov, and Voroshilov, 26  Feb. 1938  //  AHN-Madrid. Diversos. M. 
Pascua. Exp. 6, 7.
35 Ibid.
36 Pascua to Foreign Ministry, Barcelona, 22 Jan. 1937 // Ibid. Exp. 14, 5. 
37 For Pascua’s Paris mission, though one that largely ignores the Soviet question, see: Miralles R. “La 
embajada de Marcelino Pascua in París durante la Guerra Civil Española (21 de abrile de 1938–28 de febrero 
de 1939)” // Bulletin d’histoire contemporaine de l’Espagne. 1999. No. 28–29. P. 135–158.
38 See: Alvarez del Vayo J. The Last Optimist. P. 284–287; Fischer L. Men and Politics. London, 1941. 
P. 364–365.
39 This was not always the case, as requests were sometimes made through Soviet representatives in 
Spain, or through the Republic’s embassy in Moscow. The record indicates that on 27 April 1937 Pascua 
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These considerations aside, the contrasting levels of support is still jarring, not least 
because, by fall 1936, Republican officials were well aware of the new ground rules estab-
lished by the international community: the French were committed to non-intervention, 
while the Soviets were willing to sell their best hardware, dispatch pilots and tank crews, 
and lend their top advisors. Given these factors, the Republic’s poor upkeep of its Moscow 
embassy defies explanation.
The insufficient support given to the Moscow embassy had several major and unques-
tionably detrimental repercussions on the overall effectiveness of the Spanish mission. To 
begin with, the nonexistence of any auxiliary personnel at the embassy forced Pascua — 
and later Polo and Pedroso — to carry out not only the major functions of ambassador or 
chargé d’affaires, but also the secondary tasks normally performed by attachés, assistants, 
or staff. The principal responsibility was, of course, initiating and maintaining high-level 
contacts with the Soviet leadership. Pascua’s early celebrity status in Moscow made this 
goal quite unproblematic, and his interview schedule through the first year of the war 
indicates that he had unprecedented access to any commissariat in the city, and thus to the 
architects of Soviet policy. The Republican government, despite its inaction in processing 
Pascua’s pleas for funds and staff, counted on their ambassador for the timely delivery of 
requests for military aid to the Soviet leadership40.
Had Pascua or his successors only been responsible for conveying the Republic’s mil-
itary needs to the Defense Commissariat and lobbying Voroshilov for rapid action, this 
certainly would have already been a daunting and challenging responsibility. Yet their at-
tention was to a large degree diverted to the myriad minor obligations of diplomatic affairs 
that, for lack of any staff, fell on their shoulders. With no officer to coordinate counter-in-
telligence, Pascua was required to investigate reports of suspected fascist or Nationalist 
spies infiltrating Republican vessels41. As the embassy never received a military (let alone 
ess aviation) attaché, first Pascua, then Polo and Pedroso filled the void. When in 1937 the 
Republic began sending pilot trainees to the USSR for instruction, the ambassador found 
himself overseeing the project, despite his conspicuous paucity of experience in military 
aviation42. Similarly, responsibility for the welfare of the three thousand refugee children 
evacuated to the USSR was also assigned to the Moscow embassy. Here as elsewhere, the 
mission was in over its head, frequently pleading with the Republican government to send 
officials from the Education Ministry to ensure effective monitoring of the young evacu-
ees43. Were all of this not enough, the lead man at the embassy invariably played the role 
of financial and commercial attaché, charged with arranging credit extensions, overseeing 
the gold transfer, keeping track of the four Bank of Spain families detained in Russia, and 
appealed directly to Stalin for increased shipments of aircraft (APRF. F. 3. Op. 65. D. 223. L. 173–174). 
Generally, however, the inherent stability of the Republican and Soviet missions in Paris made them more 
reliable than negotiating such arrangements in the USSR or Spain. Incidentally, the fact that the arms 
traffic was being carried out through intermediaries in the French capital was a poorly guarded secret. In 
November 1936, German intelligence agents ascertained as much and alerted their superiors in Berlin. See: 
Dumont to German Embassy in France, 11 Nov. 1936 // Documents on German Foreign Policy. Series C, 
vol V. Washington, 1957. P. 128.
40 For example, a July memo from the Ministry of Defense implored Pascua to urgently secure the 
dispatch of additional aviation to replace recent losses. Giral to Pascua, 11  July 1937  //  AHN-Madrid. 
Diversos. M. Pascua. Leg. 2. Exp. 2, 1.
41 Captain of the Antonio de Satrustegui to Pascua, 25 Dec. 1936 // Ibid. Exp. 14, 8.
42 See: Ibid. Exp. 8, 1–8; Leg. 12. Exp. 2, 1–3, 9, 12.
43 See: Ibid. Leg. 2. Exp. 10-1, 15, 10-3, 6, 8, 12, 25.
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serving as trade negotiator in the burgeoning traffic of non-military goods between the 
USSR and the Republic44.
In addition to the problems generated by the overwork and over-extension of Pascua 
and his successors, the second consequence of Spanish neglect of the Moscow embassy 
was a deterioration of relations between the Soviet regime and the Republic’s Moscow 
delegation. It is clear that the Soviets’ heavy investment in and VIP treatment of the Re-
public’s mission to Moscow was never reciprocated. Over time, the Republic’s careless ne-
glect of their Russian embassy began to alienate the Soviets and made them less willing to 
continue their collaboration. Official Soviet sources long denied any falling out between 
the two states, but this is not surprising, as the issue was doubtlessly an embarrassment to 
all involved45.
It has been noted above that a little over a year after arriving, in late November 1937, 
Pascua was worried that his lack of staff and resources may leave a “poor impression” 
on the Soviet government46. A poorer impression still was left by the ambassador’s own 
unceremonious departure in the spring of 1938. Pascua was rarely present in the last few 
months of his Moscow sojourn, and he received his Paris assignment while in Spain, a 
post which he immediately took up. He never formally took leave of the Soviet leadership 
in person, nor of the larger diplomatic community in Russia. Indeed, some weeks after 
arriving in Paris, Pascua instructed his adjutant Polo to send out apologies for this breach 
of protocol47. He himself, however, took care to personally notify the Soviet officials with 
whom he had worked most closely. In February 1938, Pascua telephoned Potemkin to 
express his regret that he would not be returning to Moscow48. Later that spring, writing 
to Litvinov in English, Pascua was unusually contrite as he expressed regret and embar-
rassment over the course of events: 
I must confess to you that I am very disturbed indeed by this forced alteration of what 
should be normal behavior and the more so remembering your continuous courtesies and 
kindnesses regarding me and the noble attitude of the Soviet Government in regard [sic] the 
Spanish Republic as well49.
The same day, Pascua penned a similarly humble letter, in French, to Stalin, asking 
that the Soviet leader express his apologies and his gratitude, to Molotov and Voroshilov50.
Apologies aside, with Pascua gone relations worsened in the late spring and summer 
of 1938. It became increasingly clear to any cogent observer that the Republic would not 
appoint a new ambassador in Pascua’s place. Polo was keenly aware that Soviet leadership 
44 See: AHN-Madrid. Diversos. M. Pascua. Exp. 14, 3, 12, 5, 9. — A brief digression is necessary to 
clarify the reference to the “four Bank of Spain families”. Soviet military support to the Spanish Republic was 
paid for through the transfer of a large part of Madrid’s gold stocks, housed until September 1936 in the Bank 
of Spain. When the gold was mobilized and shipped to the USSR, the Republic dispatched with it a group of 
bank officials and their dependants to ensure fair exchange. These families subsequently found themselves 
stranded in Moscow, and it fell to Pascua to provide for their well-being and oversee their repatriation.
45 For example, the 1975 publication by the Academy of Sciences of the USSR insists that “Soviet-
Spanish relations remained invariably friendly until the end of the national-revolutionary war” (see: 
International Solidarity with the Spanish Republic, 1936–1939. Moscow, 1974. P. 312).
46 Pascua to Zugazagoitia, 28 Nov. 1937 // AHN-Madrid. Diversos. M. Pascua. Leg. 2. Exp. 12, 21.
47 Pascua to Polo, 22 Apr. 1938 // Ibid. Exp. 10-2, 14.
48 APRF. F. 3. Op. 65. D. 226. L. 37–38.
49 Pascua to Litvinov, 5 Apr. 1938 // AHN-Madrid. Diversos. M. Pascua. Leg. 2. Exp. 9-4, 20.
50 Pascua to Stalin, 5 Apr 1938 // APRF. F. 3. Op. 65. D. 226. L. 62–63.
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had interpreted Spain’s attitude towards its Moscow mission as a major insult. Polo de-
scribed his first days in charge of the embassy in this way:
I now find myself totally neglected by all our “Russian friends” and all this time I have 
received from them not a single word of support nor the most minimal demonstration of 
interest… In other areas I have also observed a deliberate withdrawal and coldness with respect 
to the Spanish question51. 
A week later, attending May Day celebrations in Red Square, Polo was shocked that in 
a long speech, Voroshilov made only one passing allusion to the Spanish Civil War52. In a 
letter to Pascua, Polo offered an interpretation:
On the occasion of May 1 I sent a letter of congratulations to the Foreign Commissariat, 
which to this date has not responded. I continue to have the impression that something is amiss 
with respect to those of us in this embassy, and I can’t help but conclude that it may be the result 
of our not having an ambassador53.
Pascua’s response confirmed that both men agreed on the problem of the embassy 
vis-à-vis the Republican government: 
For my part, I urged the Ministry to resolve this abnormal situation which in fact could 
damage the relations between both countries. Given how sensitive the Russians can be, the 
prolongation of this irregular situation will produce some ill will. The first to be injured and 
bothered by this will be you54.
Polo, of course, was neither the first nor the last. His replacement, Pedroso, who was 
at the helm until late March 1939, sent the Foreign Ministry a note on 25 July 1938 indi-
cating that he had been “warmly received by Litvinov, Potemkin and Weinberg”55. After 
this date, however, the new chargé d’affaires had virtually no contact whatsoever with any 
Soviet official of consequence. Several weeks before the end, he recounted his isolation to 
Pascua:
Recent events have produced absolutely no modification in our relations with the authorities, 
which continue to be as restrictive as ever. Not a single soul has approached me during these sad 
days. Not a word and not a single visit56.
51 Polo to Pascua, 24 Apr. 1938 // AHN-Madrid. Diversos. M. Pascua. Leg. 2. Exp. 10-3, 1.
52 Polo to Pascua, 12 May 1938 // Ibid. Exp. 10-3, 6. — To balance this gloomy assessment, however, 
it must be pointed out that elsewhere the archival and press record makes it clear enough that the Spanish 
question had not in fact disappeared from official pronouncements or public discourse. In July of the same 
year, VOKS organized an exhibition in Moscow devoted to the Spanish Republic’s Quinto Regimento. See: 
Pedroso to Foreign Ministry, Valencia, 31  July 1938  //  AMAE, Archivo de Barcelona. Apt. 1. Carp. 57. 
Informe 6, 734–735. To cite one additional example, six months after Voroshilov’s short shrift given to 
the Republicans during his May Day remarks, the annual delegation of visiting Loyalists was per usual 
featured prominently in the festivities marking the twenty-first anniversary of the Russian Revolution. Their 
participation was even included in a widely disseminated Soyuzkinochronika newsreel. 
53 Polo to Pascua, 12 May 1938 // AHN-Madrid. Diversos. M. Pascua. Leg. 2. Exp. 10-3, 6.
54 Pascua to Polo, 23 May 1938 // Ibid. Exp. 10-2, 8.
55 Pedroso to Foreign Ministry, Valencia, 25 July 1938 // AMAE, Archivo de Barcelona. Apt. 1. Carp. 
57. Informe 2, 716.
56 Pedroso to Pascua, 3 March 1939 // AHN-Madrid. Diversos. M. Pascua. Leg. 2. Exp. 12, 25.
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The embassy’s poor standing was evident on two occasions in the last months of 
1938. The first of these occurred when Pascua travelled from Paris to Moscow in August 
of that year to win an audience with the Soviets and present to them a request for arms57. 
The second occasion was Ignacio Hidalgo de Cisneros’ December 1938 emergency visit 
to Moscow. The Republican government had dispatched its air force chief to the Soviet 
capital in a desperate attempt to secure fresh military hardware from the Russians. It need 
hardly be underlined that the purpose of this mission, or indeed Pascua’s trip in late sum-
mer, would have normally been executed by a competent and operational embassy. The 
Valencia government was evidently well aware of the cumulative damage it had inflicted 
on the Moscow operation. Thus Pedroso, though the official Loyalist representative in the 
USSR, played no role in the negotiations for increased aid in later 1938.
At this point, it should be clear that during the Spanish Civil War the principal im-
pediment to the effective functioning of the Republic’s Moscow embassy was not an in-
creasingly mistrustful Soviet regime, but an indifferent and neglectful home government. 
Pascua’s initial objectives were daunting: first, to establish high-level contact with the So-
viet leadership, and second, to solicit large-scale military and technical assistance. To his 
surprise, Pascua discovered on his arrival that the entire Soviet public had already been 
mobilized to support the Republican cause. More importantly, the regime was favorably 
disposed toward assisting the Spanish ambassador in all facets of his mission. Thus, the 
question arises, given the potential benefits of the Soviets’ positive attitude towards the 
Republic — best exemplified through the privileges bestowed on Pascua — why did the 
Republican government apparently starve its Moscow embassy? Two possible explana-
tions may explain the rise and fall of Pascua’s mission.
First, it is conceivable that the counterproductive treatment of the Moscow delegation 
was in fact no deliberate sabotage at all, but rather the result of the myriad logistical prob-
lems that Republican officials were ill equipped to handle. In this scenario, the Republic 
had every intention of exploiting Moscow’s assistance to the fullest, but the exigencies of 
war did not permit greater support of and communication with its Moscow-based rep-
resentatives. At the same time, it is possible that once the Republican government ascer-
tained that the Soviets could be counted on to supply the Popular Army, there was no 
further need to expend resources on the upkeep of its Soviet mission. In effect, Pascua’s 
objectives had been accomplished for him, even before he arrived in the Russian capital58. 
On the other hand, some evidence suggests that the Republic’s undermining of its 
Moscow mission was the direct result of factional disagreements within the governing 
coalition. Let us recall that among the numerous political struggles that shook the Loy-
alist government during the civil war was an ongoing attempt by the PSOE leadership, 
together with its moderate allies, to stem the rising influence of the PCE. The PCE had 
much to gain through expanded Republican relations with the Soviet Union; meanwhile, 
the PSOE — in particular, its successive leaders Caballero and Prieto — attempted to foil 
Communist attempts to dominate the political arena. It is not unreasonable to conclude 
57 APRF. F. 3. Op. 65. D. 226. L. 112.
58 This is one conclusion of Gabriel Jackson, who claims that Pascua “had little or no influence on 
Soviet decision-making” (Jackson  G. Juan Negrin: Physiologist, Socialist, and Spanish Republican War 
Leader. Eastbourne, 2010. P. 58). A noted English scholar was able to astutely sum up the matter: “Pascua’s 
brief was to promote more substantial Soviet aid… But he found Stalin and his lieutenants already persuaded 
of this need” (Graham H. The Spanish Republic at War. Cambridge, 2002. P. 152).
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that while the Caballero government initially sent the Republic’s legation to Moscow, the 
premier was not about to unnecessarily inflate that embassy’s position or prestige for such 
a move would ultimately strengthen the hand of the PCE59.
But political intrigues aside, it cannot be denied that Moscow’s military support to 
the Republic adhered to a set of conditions that could never be swayed, perhaps not even 
influenced, by most-favoured nation diplomacy. Thus, the final stage of Soviet participa-
tion in the civil war — the period between August 1937 and the end of the war on 1 April 
1939 — was marked by a steady ebb in Moscow’s involvement with the Republic. Every 
major indicator of Soviet investment in a Republican victory was then in decline: arms 
supplies were dramatically scaled back; Soviet flyers and tankers began to be replaced by 
Republican crews; and, from autumn 1938, the International Brigades were withdrawn. 
The earlier agit-prop onslaught, which saw enthusiastic cultural exchanges, slowed and 
then ceased. On the domestic front, the Soviet regime began to disengage the populace 
from Spanish affairs. The war disappeared into the middle pages of Soviet state newspa-
pers, and in public speeches Soviet leaders mentioned the Republic’s cause less and less. In 
Russian cinemas, newsreels devoted to the Chinese Communists began trumping cover-
age of the war in Spain; the filmmaker Roman Karmen and his assistant left Spain in early 
summer 1937, transshipped to the Far East. For the last twenty months of the Spanish 
Civil War, the Kremlin was all but resigned to accept a Republican defeat. 
There was the intractable problem of the logistics of Operation X, which became 
more difficult over time. As the struggle wore on, the Defense Commissariat became dis-
tressed that future shipments of Soviet weaponry might be intercepted and could never 
reach the Republican shore. More to the point, after the Republic’s gold — or rather, the 
credit that gold had guaranteed — was exhausted in early 1938, any losses would be in-
curred directly by the Soviets. But a second development was equally significant in deter-
mining supply volume. Even barring successful delivery of hardware to Spain, the Sovi-
et technological advantage in the war was conclusively lost by late spring, 1937. By that 
time, the most advanced Russian tanks and planes available could no longer compete with 
the weaponry being supplied to the rebels. The arrival of the German-made HE-111 and 
ME-109 rendered the entire Red Air Force fleet of bombers, fighters, and reconnaissance 
aircraft essentially obsolete. While the Nationalists were never able to match the Russians 
in armor, the dispatch of large numbers of witheringly effective German anti-tank guns 
rendered the issue moot. 
In sum, after August 1937, even had a safe and efficient transit route from Russia been 
opened up, no matériel then being produced by the Soviet defense industry could have 
undermined the rebels’ widening position of technological domination. In this light, it is 
hardly surprising that Moscow scaled back its aid in mid-1937. Near the end of the war, 
Moscow granted the Republic a large line of credit, and renewed arms shipments as late as 
December 1938, but it was too late to save their ally60. 
59 Pascua to Zugazagoitia, 28 Nov. 1937 // AHN-Madrid. Diversos. M. Pascua. Leg. 2. Exp. 13, 21. — 
In the letter, Pascua explained his “total isolation” as a result of relations between the PCE and the Socialists.
60 The late dispatch of some $55 million worth of Soviet arms, transferred on seven ships, was for 
many years considered a myth, yet today declassified documents from the Russian State Military Archive 
(RGVA) confirm that this did indeed take place. The logistics of the operation, and contents of the delivery, 
down to the precise number of shells (1, 382, 540), are revealed in manifests in RGVA (F. 33987. Op. 3. 
D. 1259. L. 85–105). 
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The promise of Pascua’s mission to Moscow was born at the Atocha station on 30 Sep-
tember 1936. The crowd of well-wishers, the collective optimism, and the hope for the 
Republic’s salvation imbued the ambassador’s journey to Soviet Russia with a rich sym-
bolism that far exceeded what the embassy could ever achieve. More critically, it cannot 
be denied that the fate of the Republic was determined in the opening months of the war, 
in July, August and September, 1936. The fascist powers’ commitment to General Franco, 
the signing of Non-Intervention by the West, and Stalin’s decision to tie his military aid to 
the finite gold reserves of the Bank of Spain, meant that outcome of the Spanish Civil War 
was dependent on a set of international conditions that evolved little even two and half 
years later. The Republic’s fortunes may have hung in the balance through summer 1936, 
but Madrid’s fate was sewn up before Pascua arrived in Moscow on 7 October 1936. The 
trials and tribulations of the Republic’s embassy in the Soviet Union, and the ambassador’s 
belief in a grand missed opportunity, would be of little consequence. Diplomacy was an 
illusion.
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